

COUNTING CYBER WEAPONS

New Approaches to identify and control destructive cyber tools

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- **Why** is the question important?
- **What** are destructive cyber tools?
- **How** can cyber weapons get identified and controlled?
- **Next** steps towards a necessary regulation?



- Ongoing militarization of the cyberspace
 - Big players, NATO and countries in Europe planing with offensive cyber capabilities
 - Problematic trending topics active/forward defense and hack back
- Debates & initiatives on the peaceful development of the cyberspace
- For arms control the cyberspace is different & established approaches fail
- Many new technical questions raise the necessity of IT security community integration



- Missing official common understanding for the term "cyber weapon"
 - Analogy of attacks with cyber weapons and its effects related to the "use of force"
 - Usually interpreted as "serious harm of objects or people"
 - Assessment by intend and effects of incidents
- But: arms control need *ex ante* measurable parameters
- Counting bits and bytes?



- Disclaimer: Work in progress
 - Differentiating cyber weapons within spectrum of malware
 - Indicators that distinguishes a cyber weapon
 - Means of propagation: from targeted and tailored to randomly spread
 - Controllability of the deployment: from fully manual to automated (see the LAWS debates)
 - Autonomy of payload evolution and abilities to stop the payload
 - Quality of penetration measure (uniqueness and distribution of the vulnerability & exploits)
 - Quality assurance and handling prevention of unintended effects
- ➔ Indicators to assess a specific tool towards its "cyber weapon character"



- Classifying the potential impact of a cyber weapon
 - Cyber weapons can work very differently in comparison to conventional weapons
 - Dimensions to consider
 - Degree of possible direct damage of a cyber weapon
 - Spatial (how many) and temporal effects (how long)
 - Second level (directly connected systems) and third level (depended systems) effects
 - Intended and unintended effects
- ➔ Dimensions to classify cyber weapons by its entire potential effects



- Practically measurable parameters of cyber weapons
- "External" parameters without adjustments to existing IT systems
 - Power consumption and capacities of the power supply
 - Thermal performance of the cooling systems
 - Network bandwidths and maximum capacities
 - Amount and data rates of network connections
 - Amount of technical and administration staff
- ➔ Many parameters measurable by existing systems
- ➔ Suitable for monitoring the status quo of facilities



- "Internal" parameters with necessary adjustments on tools or infrastructures
 - Network connection metadata (who transmits what to whom and how often)
 - Usage of anonymization services
 - Detection of digital artifacts, exploits, and security vulnerabilities
- ➔ Monitoring the current application of systems
- ➔ Acceptance and political approval in question
- ➔ But: Probable unilateral measure for trust building

Next steps towards a necessary regulation?



- Stronger integration of the computer science community
- Development of technical procedures for measurement
- International definition of cyber weapons
- Agreements on limiting the (unintended) destructive effects



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