

Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg

Working Group 3: Cyberspace and Warfare

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- A little bit of context
- What is a cyber attack?
- The fuzziness of prediction with malware
- Problems for confidence and peace building measures in cyberspace
- Consequences and next steps

A little bit of context



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
- Stuxnet 2010 and its aftermath
 - Protagonists with "cyber arsenals"
 - Questions of own vulnerabilities
 - Consequences for international security
- UNIDIR study 2013*
 - 47 states with military cyber programs
 - 10 states with dedicated offensive military orientation

* United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research "The Cyber Index - International Security Trends and Realities", Geneva, 2013

What is a cyber attack

- Most of the malicious activities in cyberspace are cybercrime
 - Scope of law enforcement
- What if the protagonists are states?
 - Scope of humanitarian law and the law of armed conflicts
- What ist the threshold between penetration and attack?
 - What is the equivalent of "armed attack" in terms of humanitatian law?


Brown, G. D. & Tullos, O. W. "On the Spectrum of Cyberspace Operations", Small Wars Journal, 2012







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What is a cyber attack /2



- Binding and uniform definitions necessary for
 - Evaluation of concrete conflicts Something is a cyber weapon if its damage equals the damage of an armed attack as defined by the UN Charta Art. 51
 - Classificatons for disarmament agreements, arms control and verification
 - To confine between defence and offense capabilities
 - Setting the threshold for dual use regulations

The fuzziness of prediction



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- Fuzziness of prediction with malware:
 - How to estimate the vulnerabilities
 - How to estimate the necessary ressources for a specific effect / damage
 - How to control and operate a released malware
 - How to specify what target they will hit (and which not)
 - How to estimate the chain effects of disrupted/destroyed IT systems



- Specific features of cyber weapons as problem for established concepts
 - Immaterial
 - Virtual
 - Easy to duplicate
 - No specific technical facilities necessary
 - Strong dual use character
 - Difficulties with attribution

Measures	Elements	Applicable for Cyber Space?
Geographical	Demilitarized ZonesThin-out Zones	Not possible
Structural	Defensive Orientation of Armed Forces	 Accept defense but prohibit offense?
Operational	Limits on Maneuvers and Exercises	 Prohibit offensive military exercisies
Declaratory	No first Use	Unilateral declarations
Verification	 Air- or space-based sensors 	unlikely

*Neuneck, G, "Confidence Building Measures - Application to the Cyber Domain", Lecture, 2012




- Vulnerability of important systems / critical infrastructures
- Effects and damages of malware are the key for their regulation
- Build up better defence, but avoid concerns about better offence
- Shaping the cyberspace as its a man made domain

Thanks



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- Its easy to vandalise random targets but hard(er) to hit a specific one
- Military planing differs highly from criminal planing
 - Identification of possible high quality strategic targets and their weaknesses
 - Need for undetected system flaws to gain access to the systems
 - Build up a persistence in the target systems to be ready in time
 - "1 or 2 till 5 years for planning time" (Felix Lindner, Recurity Labs)
 - Cyber weapons aren't cheap



- What are cyber weapons and how to classify them?
 - By its technical specifications (directed, controlable, predictable use of force)
 - By the damage it cause (intended and unintended)
 - By the intention of its operators (who against whom, why, for what purpose)